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Can one be interested in the theoretical link between economics, politics, and public
finances without considering the notion of urban governance ? A negative answer to this
question may be contended, according to the noticeable amount of papers, congresses and
current contributions to the literature. Thus, since the notion of urban governance stands for
the involvement of a larger diversity of actors (beyond State and local public actors) in the
urban management of French cities, it seems easy to give way to temptation by assimilating
urban governance to participatory and democratic features of the government of these cities.
Isn’t it exactly to answer to more and more frequent demands from citizens to get a
higher level of personal involvement in urban management that local governance and
grassroots democracy are advocated together, and mostly that a law has been currently voted
(law 2002-276, 2002 February 27
th on local democracy) ?
The point of view conveyed in this paper will challenge this commonly prevailing (or
even implicit) belief in France. The geographical frame of this study will be limited to this
given country, which is consistent with our purpose, for it can be considered as the birthplace
of democratic modern ideas, notably since the 18
th century. Moreover, one must underline that
France comprises more than 36000 cities, that is to say more than all European countries as a
whole, and that this country has been long ago characterised by a very strong tradition of
centralism and Jacobin power. For all these reasons, France appears to be a stimulating
geographical frame to observe the evolution of local democracy.
The main assumption which will be tested refers to a former contribution
1, in which
governance had been sees as a solution to a limited range of urban managerial problems,
namely operational patterns, contrary to strategic ones. As a matter of fact, as a starting
assumption, proceedings belonging to urban governance will be supposed not to be favourable
to the emergence of a reinforced local democracy, embodied by a higher participation of
French citizens to the government of their cities. 
                                                
1 Thomas O. (1999) : “Urban government of French cities : between operational governance and oligarchical
strategic management, congress of the European Regional Science Association, Dublin, August.3
In order to confirm or to weaken this ideal and utopian image of urban governance, the
adequacy of this notion to actual urban economics and politics will first be questioned (1).
Then, looseness relating to adoption of the word “governance” from corporate and
development patterns to urban ones will prompt us to emphasize the structural obstructions
due to the French municipal organisation (2), and several special weaknesses of the way
associations try to get involved in urban government (3).
1 : French cities and governance : a conflicting match
1.1 : Ideal images and loosely assumed vocabulary
The actual popularization of the notion of governance in political and scientific
discourses is notably based on the increasing advertising made about this ideal model,
embodied by the participatory budget in Porto Alegre (Brazil)
2. People living in this city are
asked to take part to the choice of public investments which are to be undertaken, and to think
about the improvement of their daily environment. Therefore, that special kind of expression
is quite different from a purely representative democracy, as it is currently stressed. Actually,
a participatory  council, which is elected, is debating on the way to allocate financial
resources for investments within 16 boroughs and 8 thematic groups.
The understanding of the governance, as to the management of French cities, must get
further this somewhat specific example and take the more general notion of urban government
into account. This comparison is all the more important as the prerogatives of local
government have markedly increased since the beginning of the trend of French local
decentralisation. Thus, urban governance has been highlighted as a special modality of urban
government which is rested on a wide diversity of actors (public as well as private ones) and
granting a privilege to the potential participation of each citizen, as well as searching for
compromises. Governance, thanks to mixed public and private partnerships, differs from
relations which would be restricted to public institutions. Thus, local public managers only
represent one of the numerous influential actors, within an heterogeneous and broken up
string of potentially intervening persons and organisations
3.
                                                
2 Abers R. (1998) : “La participation populaire à Porto Alegre au Brésil”, Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine,
n°80-81, pp 43-54.
3 Thomas op. cit.4
However, the fact that this vision of urban governance is based on the importation of
the notion of corporate governance from the United States since more than 50 years, should
not be overlooked, as it is currently passed over in silence. As a matter of fact, this notion
stands for a different semantic reality. The “graft” of this notion in the French political
context has resulted in a noticeable change oh the meaning of this word. Thus, we must bear
in mind that the analysis developed by Coase
4 in 1937 introduces governance as the whole set
of devices used by the firm in order to improve the way markets enable coordination, and
referring either to hierarchy, or to contracts and rules. 
Consequently, it seems rather strange to confuse a governance which aims at making
big firms’ coordination easier and a governance which is supposed to account for the rising
complexity of local public management. Using this same word with at least a double meaning
leads to an inversion in respect to institutional economics. Besides, going thoroughly into the
historical evolution of the nature of French local power makes a second difference become
visible.
As a matter of fact, decentralisation generated an alteration from a State and
concentrated administration to an increasingly presidential government for cities, directed by
the mayor and a few experts. In other words, this amounts to noticing the change from a
hierarchical management at the local level (mainly apart from market considerations) to a new
government, allowing various partnerships and market tools (prices, contracts, …). Thus, it is
misleading to talk about governance in this second case, according to the initial definition of
Coase, for it suggests that this notion is linked to the complexity of costs and structures.
Therefore, as mentioned by Lorrain
5, this would result in stressing the opposite equation of
Coase’s principle : “governance of firms = reduction of transaction costs”.
In addition to this historical borrowed meaning, a geographical one, relating to the
importation of the notion of “urban governance” from the British to the French context must
be detailed. British public context has long been characterised by a progressive decrease of
the prerogatives of local governments , if favour of a global State reinstatement. Actually,
conservative national governments have emphasized the expensive and ineffective features of
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local governments in order to justify this State reinforcement. In this special context, the
notion of urban governance was supposed to reveal that local actors must share their power
with State actors. Accordingly, this notion does not suit the French reality, since this latter ins
merely characterised by the growing importance of local power holders.
Finally, borrowing the World Bank’s “good governance” is also confusing, because it
only deals with the specific problems of developing countries. This notion was supposed to
challenge the current discussions about structures and reforms by advocating a healthy
management without political interference. Problems could be tackled on a technical point of
view, without political advice.
Nevertheless, this vision of governance is not consistent with an increasing
involvement of citizens and the development of mixed cooperations, as supposed in western
countries. It is beyond argument that enacting moral, managerial and caution rules is not in
favour of a spontaneous emergence of grassroots intervention, since all these technical criteria
appear to be hardly understandable for people without public and political culture. All these
historical, geographical and political different contexts suggest that we should raise local
French managerial problems with the more traditional notion of urban government.
1.2 : Towards the persistence of the traditional notion of local government
The consistence of the actual expression of a representative democracy in French
urban government will be contended, contrary to a direct democracy advocated by Rousseau.
Then, one may assume that citizens are not able to hold a real local and participatory power.
Even though a gap of several centuries, Montesquieu and Schumpeter seem to come to an
agreement, by stressing that politicians are supposed to define long run policies for the
population, whose part is restricted to choose the candidates who will carry on these tasks.
Thus, the “ordinary man” should let elected people manage the city
6. According to
Montesquieu
7, the vicious feature of former democracies was to allow basic citizens to take
active resolutions, whereas they were completely unable to do it, at least for cognitive
reasons. 
                                                
6 Schumpeter J. (1951)  : “Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie”, Payot.
7 Montesquieu : “L’esprit des lois”, livre XI, chapitre 6.6
By emphasizing the actual persistence of a representative democracy at the local level
in France, we hint that the mayor disposes of e central regulating role, at the head of a
centralised and authoritative power. The mayor and its town council make decisions and
enforce them . That is why they are elected. Independently of an increasing number and
variety of participatory experiences, this kind of government is exerted in a wide majority of
the 36000 French cities. As mentioned by Caillosse
8, it is just as if elections had to represent
all democratic virtues. The fact that this idea would not be defensible does not prevent it from
deeply marking the French local democracy. This persistence of a weekly participatory kind
of government, even though citizens would assert a higher direct democracy, may be justified
by three typical advantages.
The first of these advantages precisely  deals with democracy. The representative
feature of local governments makes a strong democratic irrigation of society possible, due to
the huge number of cities and town councillors : approximately 1% of the national population
is elected at the local level. The second advantage concerns the separation of powers which is
allowed by this representative network. Citizens would rather get rid of a lot of political tasks,
which are delegated to specialised actors. Restricting the management of cities to professional
people (experts or elected) would generate a higher level of efficiency, according to Stumm
and Corrigan
9. Last of all, a representative government gives to citizens the interesting
possibility to profit by a strictly  bureaucratic management of their problems. As a matter of
fact, this latter guarantees a formal and anonymous resolution of tasks, and prevent citizens
from the negatives influences and interference of lobbies, since this system is expected to be
in favour of both the independence of the manager and the upholding of common interest. 
In addition to these advantages, one may wonder why all current experiences willing
to promote grassroots participation
10 actually failed, in spite of unanimous demands for an
increased participation of citizens, and even if politicians pretend to comply with these
requests. How can the actual lack of grassroots mobilisation in France be tackled ?
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2 : The failure of institutional attempts for a participatory local democracy
Even though displaying participatory spirits is fashionable as to the global
management of French cities, and even if citizens clearly refuse to remain passive individuals,
all the forecasts of a noticeable evolution seem to be thwarted. We will try to highlight the
reasons why several measures which were thought to promote grassroots participation and
consultations failed. The “revival” of local referendum and the development of inter-
communality and tax consolidation since the eighties will be successively presented.
2.1 : The endemic weaknesses of local referendum
The official establishing of a real local referendum clashed several times into the
opposition expressed by associations on the one hand, and elected mayors and councillors on
the other hand. Indeed, associations are rather against local referendums insofar as they fear to
be dispossessed of the dialogue with citizens , since mayors could easily gerrymander this
“democratic” vote. Several surveys showed that, in merely  all cases, an association which
was opposed to municipal plans was bound to loose at the end of the referendum. This
statement seems rather critical at first sight in terms of local democracy , insofar as local
referendums are supposed to make participation easier … and insofar as people who wish to
participate often gather within associations. 
The reasons why locally elected people have always been extremely reticent as to the
setting up of local referendums is obvious : they naturally intended to preserve their power.
The French Association of Mayors (AMF) expressed several times its refusal of any kind of
referendum, although it may  be purely in an advisory capacity. AMF echoed to the decision
of anticonstitutionality of local referendums which has been pronounced in 1991 may 9
th by
the French Constitutional Council. That is the reason why legislators, before 1992, have
always refused to acknowledge the “illegal” referendums which have been locally organised. 
In other respects, it seems that local referendums could thwart the expression of an
urban participatory democracy instead of promoting it, due to the smallness of the percentage
of people who vote. As a result, the low participation which has been always observed, up to
now, for such public approbation would entail that decisions would be taken by a minority of8
the population, contrary to the democratic effect which is expected. Moreover, a perverse
trend of demagogic diversion could appear. Municipal authorities could search for plebiscites,
just by carefully defining the question which is submitted to vote.
All these reasons entailed the establishing in 1992 of a “new” local referendum, which
has been restricted to a purely advisory vote, but in no case a decisive one. Therefore this
amounts to saying that any significant progress of participatory democracy has willingly been
hindered, whereas representative democracy has been strengthened. As a matter of fact, the
use by the laws 92-125 (1992 February 6
th) and 95-115 (1995 February 4
th) of the ambiguous
word of “referendum” must be underlined, for this term represents a real grassroots possibility
to make a decision, at the national level, whereas it conveys no power at all at the local level.
People, by indirect means, only give a simple opinion on a key  issue which could be tackled
without asking for this opinion, or even without taking this expressed opinion into account !
As a matter of fact, according to the law, municipal authorities are not compelled to
respect the final results of the vote. Thus, the referendum appears to be rather a local
consultation or merely an opinion poll. It has been formed by the legislators (that is to say
Deputies of the National Parliament) to be devoid of any constraining feature, and to avoid
the risk of diversion in a view to compulsory decisions. The amazing insistence of local laws
(“Code des Communes” and “Code Général des Collectivités Locales” – CC & CGCT),
which repeat 44 times the word “consultation” has been quoted by Leclerc
11.
These legal “safety measures” include the conditions which must be respected for a
popular initiative, that is for people in order to generate a referendum on their own will. In
fact, this possibility, which has been created by the law of 1995 (previously mentioned) seems
rather virtual, because no referendum happened thanks to this mean (since this date), except in
a little village of 151 inhabitants. Then allowing and closely foreseeing the organisation of
such a referendum amounts to prohibit this possibility. As a matter of fact, the condition for
the allowance of people’s initiatives are rather restrictive : 20% of the electors of the city must
sign for it. This constraint is very powerful. 
                                                





Accordingly, this is not surprising that 60% of local referendums have been organised
in cities gathering less than 3500 inhabitants, since it is all the more expensive and difficult to
appeal to people, as they are numerous. However, such a grassroots combine can only result
in a simple debate of the town council. The assumed power of this popular mobilisation is
annihilated by the fact that the town council is retaining its real power, that is to decide to start
the referendum or to refuse to do it. Popular initiative, which is quantitatively hard to appear,
may have no results at all. This strongly restricts its supposed democratic and participatory
virtues. 
Even though this great ratio may be reached and its expression may be taken into
account by local authorities, it is important to highlight the constraining agenda which
defines, according to the law, the dates which could be fixed for starting such referendums. In
the present case, the popular seizin cannot be scheduled before the second year and after the
fourth year of the election of the town council in a given city (article number 2143-3 CGCT).
Therefore, two referendums at most can be scheduled during the six years of a municipal
mandate.
All these shackles to popular initiative result in the leading part of the mayor as to the
decision to organise a referendum. The municipal team is entitled to choose the question
which will be referred to people and the way to write it. Thus, although indirectly, the choice
of electors may be strongly  influenced. Counter-plans will not necessarily   be integrated into
the information documents given to people, since the law does not compel mayors to do it
(article 125-2 CC). Then, several points may  be observed : on the one hand, mayors
frequently give their point of view, and on the other hand the vote generally ratifies their
solution. 
For instance, mayors who are not in favour of the integration into a metropolitan area
will have a propensity to let people choose, thanks to a referendum, in order not to be directly
responsible for the refusal to join such an inter-municipal structure. Nevertheless, we must
point out that more than 90% of electors used to refuse to join a metropolitan area when their
advice has been previously asked
12. Thus, the referendum is rather a way for the mayor to
legitimate a decision which has already been taken, however positive (building sports
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infrastructure) or negative (refusal to increase local taxes) it may be. It is not an actual way to
take the advice of people , or to express a will to increase grassroots participation.
2.2 : The shackles of metropolitan areas and districts 
The same issue may be stressed at the level of districts and metropolitan areas. Let us
consider the general case of Public Institutions of Inter-Cities Co-operation (EPCI). Taking
the advice of people belonging to an EPCI, that is to say to a set of several cities, depends on
the suggestion of all the mayors of member cities, whereas the other solution is a written
request from 20% of the electors of the whole EPCI. But the EPCI council is not compelled to
respect the results of a referendum, as mentioned before for cities. 
Moreover, the very features of French EPCI represent an additional hinder to
participatory democracy. The main reason is the lack of direct election for the members of
EPCI councils, insofar as co-operation between cities has no political origin but rather
depends on management goals, in order to avoid wasting money by multiplying expensive
infrastructure in each city. This situation results in a noticeable sinking of the proximity
between each citizen and EPCI councils, for there is no elective link between them. Thus, it is
not surprising that 71% of a sample of 157 presidents of EPCI and mayors may be opposed to
a direct universal suffrage for the election of EPCI councils
13. 
It is also amazing that the law about “proximity democracy” (2002-276, 2002
February 27
th) finally dismisses in its last version this principle of a direct vote for EPCI
councils, due to reticence of the members of the French Parliament. Therefore, EPCI’S
executive power is fiercely opposed to the indispensable condition for democratic lawfulness,
that is the direct election by citizens. Various arguments have been put forward in order to
justify this wide gap, in relation to the emerging aspirations of people : the will to restrict the
number of elections, the refusal to latently suppress the French “départements”
(administrative level between cities and Regions), or merely the too important loss of the
managing power of  cities. 
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Accordingly, the power and the constitution of EPCI councils are directly determined
by municipal executives, which is not inconsistent with the new laws about EPCI and
decentralisation. These laws intended to “dust and boost” co-operations between cities more
than to promote the democratic feature of their management. As a result, the share of citizens
in EPCI councils is extremely symbolic. As a matter of fact, EPCI councillors almost
exclusively come from town councils, and most of them belong to the municipal political
majority. Thus, the democracy at the EPCI level would be taken away by politicians and
notables, and would restrain itself to a dummy democracy which would be mastered by town
councillors and representatives
14.
These cumulative powers, and the obscure understanding of the actual working and
internal influences of EPCI structures by citizens naturally results in their relinquishment of
any participatory slight desires. The easier solution for “basic” citizens is to ascribe EPCI
actions to the nearest elected actor, that is their mayor. Besides, numerous presidents of EPCI
used to magnify this confusion in people’s mind, by thinking that it is up to town
representatives to diffuse EPCI information. 
Consequently, the essence of co-operations between cities is to consider citizens like
“simple” consumers, rather than electors. What matters most is economic rather than
democratic features. This lack of democracy derives from the impossibility for citizens to
disapprove (thanks to their vote) the policy of their EPCI. This situation entails various
efficiency problems, insofar as cities belonging to an EPCI will naturally work for their own
interests, even to the prejudice of EPCI’S global and common interest. Finally, we are still
very far away from a participatory democracy between co-operating cities, since this given
democracy is not even representative !
Beyond this central weakness, the most thorny issue is based on the rising importance
of the EPCI level of administration in a rising number of strategic urban fields. It seems that
the main hinder to local democracy is not the impossibility to vote (positively or negatively),
but rather the current transfer of entire parts of the government of cities from the town level to
the EPCI level. Thus, the new powers and the new fiscal resources granted to EPCI structures
are disconnected from any  democratic lawfulness and from any possibility of grassroots
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actual participation. As a matter of fact, people are aware neither of the level of local taxes
which are integrated into the budget of the EPCI to which they belong, nor of the level of
public services as against this. 
To sum up, all the previous arguments suggest that local referendum and co-operation
between cities markedly failed to promote an increased participatory democracy. However,
succeeding in this difficult task does not compel to confine oneself to public actors and to
proposed or imposed laws. Associations must not be forgotten, because of their number,
dynamism, and their ability to spontaneously seize themselves as to specific urban issues.
3 : The weaknesses of local democracy expressed by the existence of local
associations
Nevertheless, such an ability will appear to be relatively tenuous. As a matter of fact,
the difficulty to be beyond punctual, temporary and “personal” problems (in order to privilege
common interest) will be underlined. Then, we will proceed to apprehend the reasons of the
very low participation of people to those associations, amounting to a risk of conflicting
lobbies. 
3.1 : Local associations : some defective and embryonic tools of participation
First of all, the sense of the word “participation” which will be referred to throughout
our purpose must be defined. Participation may be seen as a simple diffusion of information,
as asking people’s advice (which has no constraining effect to the final decision), or finally as
a real dialogue and work in co-operation. Only this third meaning will be considered as actual
participation. 
Most of the time, associations are the best structures for isolated citizens to create
lobbies, to raise their complaints and claims to public entities, which otherwise would have
been impossible. Their main strength consists in the sum of people they represent, since their
supporters may also be local electors. In some very specific cases, associations succeeded in
re-orientating decisions which had already been taken by town councils, or even in cancelling
them. Nevertheless, these situations are rather scarce, for it is quite difficult to spontaneously13
generate a very strong rounding up of opposed people (which is required). The French case of
the popular lobby intending to delete the toll-gate of the urban highway at Roques sur
Garonne may be advocated.
Thus, the participation of each citizen to urban government must use collective entities
in order to have a real effect. Isolated individuals, or even little associations remain politically
invisible and left out of any kind of participation, since local authorities are not compelled to
pay attention to people who are devoid of power. Symmetrically, powerful associations may
diverge from their initial goal (that is representing the opinion of a specific part of the
population) towards a narrow-minded political opposition and an official or unofficial strategy
to conquest power. According to Hamilton
15, associations would not have an earthly chance to
succeed if they would not politicise their plans. Insofar as public authorities generally pay
more attention to rebellious people rather than co-operating citizens, there is a risk for
associations to become “aggressive” lobbies. As a result, do associations embody real
stepping stones in order to make grassroots participation easier ? Are they only becoming
“American” lobbies, searching for power, clash and struggle ?
As stressed by Haeringer
16, developing associations and promoting democracy may
sometimes be inconsistent, contrary to the common belief. As to the case of Porto Alegre,
Abers
17 emphasizes that promoting grassroots participation amounts to promoting the most
provided part of the population, notably for cognitive reasons. The efficiency of the action
exerted by a given quarter in order to be in favour of a given public investment will strongly
influence its priority level, independently of its collective cost and final utility.
This low level of democracy through associations seems to echo the low level of
grassroots participation. There is often a wide gap between the will of associations and their
supporters to be more involved in urban management on the one hand, and the real level of
participation of people on the other hand. Thus, people at the head of associations and lobbies
would intend to conquest power, however symbolic it may be. They would not be really
interested in the development of a complementary democratic participation. Actually, they
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would rather fight for a substitution to established authorities. The request for an increased
participation of the population could paradoxically only be in favour of individual and selfish
interests. 
Independently of the political goals of associations, the fact that they are naturally
characterised by punctual and narrow-minded plans and claims must be pointed out
18. Most of
associative mobilisations are only temporary and deal with very punctual and actual cases.
Therefore, these associations are often dissolved when the municipal plans they were fighting
against are realised, in spite of their opposition, or even relinquished. Considering once more
the case of Porto Alegre reveals that grassroots participation, although moderate (8,4% of
adults during 5 years) has been decreasing at the same pace of the availability of financial
resources. Thus, grassroots participation would not survive without the actual ability to satisfy
selfish interests.
This statement raises the previous problem of the incompatibility between democracy,
grassroots participation and associative lobbies. Considering urban public management as a
clash between a potential multiplicity of selfish interests endangers the fulfilment of common
interest
19. The risk lies in the insidious development of a “patchwork democracy”, of a
customer society which would be more interested in the width of pavements, in the breach of
the peace caused by night clubs, in the financial resources of given sports clubs, than in a
global and consistent urban policy. Could one promote the attraction of new firms, cultural
and social investments, a healthy budgetary management, by only dealing with “individual”
claims ?
All these limits can be illustrated in some specific urban associations : quarter
councils. In our mind, as their action is quite punctual, and as quarter councils only gather few
citizens, with a very low level of participation, the opinion of authors stressing the “good
governance” they create must be challenged. The two main weaknesses of quarter councils
are their inability to extend the limits of their actions and thoughts beyond the restricted
geographical area which defines them, on the one hand, and their low representative feature
on the other hand. By the way, yearly general meetings of quarter councils or even the
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number of their supporters are known to represent at most 2% of the population of each
quarter
20. This results in a low lawfulness, which is magnified by a strong financial
dependence on municipal resources. 
Moreover, local democracy and quarter councils would almost be naturally
inconsistent insofar as this local level would be completely unable to overstep its particular
interests and concerns. Even though all quarters may fittingly put their individual goals
together, in favour of common interest, as if by magic, it would not actually be enough. As a
matter of fact, living close to someone else in the same quarter does not necessarily entail the
emergence of a common interest, however little this quarter may be. Finally, the irreparable
lag between territories for daily life (quarter) and for actual urban management (EPCI) must
be underlined.
3.2 : Are we getting farther away from local democracy ?
The very low level of grassroots participation to urban government and management
illustrates the inability to compel to participatory democracy. One must have overestimated
the ability of people to join new contractual partnerships, and most of all to have a say in the
matter. One of the potential explanations of these failures could lie in the difficulties to import
private devices into the public area. Nevertheless, this graft may partly divert or totally loose
the initial spirit and efficiency of these devices. Intending to develop contracts and horizontal
relations actually failed, since it has led to the promotion of partnerships which are often
restricted to public entities, as expressed by the strong supervision exerted by municipal
authorities in most of urban plans. 
Consequently, urban actual government is still based on the prevailing powers of
notables, that is on a merely representative democracy. Decentralisation did not bring the
question of this current equilibrium up again. Conversely, it has contributed to reinforce the
presidential and almost monarchic features of municipal power. As a matter of fact, the mayor
can cumulate executive and legislative powers, contrary to the President of the Republic,
whereas he is only indirectly elected by citizens (NB : citizens vote for a municipal council
which chooses the mayor). The key influence of the mayor as to strategic patterns of urban
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government seems to be an unavoidable feature. Don’t we spontaneously connect a French
city with its mayor, which sometimes entails the election of his wife or his son for the
following mandates in order to succeed him ?
In other respects, it would be misleading to correlate democracy with diversifying and
multiplying involved actors. Ignoring the strategic and political links between these actors
would give support to a false idea, according to which participatory democracy would be
spreading. Thus, powers and influences must be taken into account , so that a kind of
consolidation of public structures may be revealed. Despite the lack of financial links and
property rights between such public entities, it would be useful to draw what could be called
the “local and public strategic heart”
21. As a matter of fact, an EPCI, an association and the
town council cannot be considered as independent one from another, if the same persons
belong to all these entities, and mostly when the mayor can impose his strategy to all
peripheral political structures.
Therefore, it would also be misleading to correlate decentralisation with local
democracy, insofar as decentralisation looked rather like de-concentration, which does not
entail to decentralise powers. As previously mentioned, grassroots participation and local
democracy cannot be compelled, even if several laws (notably article 10, law 1992 February
8
th) have tried to promote them. Nevertheless, in mots cases, this promotion has been
restricted to a simple right to be informed. 
However, giving downstream or even upstream information to people does not require
any change of the division of powers. Do additional town-halls in each quarter, in order to
make dialogue with people easier, really imply a significant sharing of actual powers ?
Municipal information does not allow the setting up of debates, in which both sides are given
a full hearing  (since that is not their purpose at all), even if the current (2002) law about
“proximity democracy” tried to modify this feature. 
The mere concern of municipal information is still to prompt people to accept the
decisions of the town council, which used to be taken without previous significant advices.
Nevertheless, even if the advice of people is taken upstream, it has no real influence, for
                                                
21  Cf. the notion of “financial hearts” notably developed in : Morin F. (1994) : “ Liaisons financières et
coopération des acteurs systèmes”, Revue Économique, n°6.17
instance on the laying out of the underground, in respect to the opinion of technical experts.
Besides, the lag between two elections is in favour of municipal authorities, the agent, and to
the prejudice of citizens, that is the principal
22.
Finally, it seems that the spreading of participatory democracy is actually expressed in
an increasing number of debates, whereas it remains a virtual trend, in daily life. Thus, the
government of the French cities and local democracy would not be suitable. Determining the
fundamental reasons of this antinomy will be contended in further researches
23.
                                                
22 Fama E.F. (1980) : “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, n°2,
April.
23 Thomas O. (2003) : “Gouvernement des villes et démocratie participative : quelles antinomies ? ”, Pouvoirs,
n°104, pp 145-158.